1958 ‘We feared the Lebanese army would mutiny’

As part of a countdown to the 50th anniversary of the 1958 US invasion of Lebanon, Sursock will be posting some of the major accounts of the events. The picture is of a Lebanese army Sherman tank engaging rebels in central Beirut.

Below is a blow-by-blow description by US military historian Jack Shulimson of the landings by Marines and their entry into Beirut.

This is an edited version.

'A coup by Brigadier Abdel Karem Kassem overthrew the Iraq government. The young Iraqi King, Faisal, was murdered and the Premier, Nuri Said, was killed while attempting to flee. These violent happenings appeared to threaten the entire Western strategic position in the Middle East.

The Iraqi revolution destroyed the government of the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan Federation, which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of Egypt and Syria.

King Hussein of Jordan had reason to fear for his own throne, and in Lebanon, president Chamoun appealed to the United States and Great Britain to intervene within 48 hours.

The Iraqi revolution caught official Washington by surprise. Trouble had been expected in Jordan or perhaps Lebanon, but not in Iraq. The oilfields in Iraq and the oil pipeline terminating in Tripoli were extremely important to the economy and military effectiveness of the Western nations.

The first news of the upheaval in Iraq reached Washington about 0300 (Washington time) 14 July. Early reports were fragmentary, but by early morning the situation had clarified, and president Eisenhower was informed at 0730.

Secretary of state John Foster Dulles arrived at his office at 0815 for an intelligence briefing and a look at the most urgent cables. The president met with the National Security Council at 0930, secretary of state dulles, vice president Richard M. Nixon, and General Nathan F. Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined the conference at 1030.

The Secretary outlined the situation in the Middle East and recommended that US military forces land in Lebanon in response to Chamoun's appeal. Eisenhower agreed that some action must be taken.

At about 1430 the same day, the president met with the Republican and Democratic leaders of Congress. The president is reputed to have said:

"I have discussed this with my people here and in the National Security Council but I must emphasize that no decision has been made. I want to give you the pros and cons. But must also emphasize that a decision must be made in the immediate future... within the next hour or two."

The president then returned to his meeting with his military and civilian advisers. They discussed the possibility of British participation, which Eisenhower rejected in that he felt "that United States forces would be adequate, and with the 3700 British troops intact on Cyprus, a reserve would be available.

General Twining informed him that the Joint Chiefs were unanimously of the opinion that action must be taken immediately. According to one source, at 1643 Eisenhower turned to Twining and said "all right we'll send `em in. Nate, put it into operation."

The assignment to carry out Eisenhower orders went to the amphibious units of the Sixth Fleet.



The Marines did not know up to the moment of the landing whether they would meet any opposition. Saeb Salem, the rebel leader in Beirut, was quoted as saying: "You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil of my country, I will regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces against them."

The US command was not too concerned, however, about the effectiveness of possible rebel resistance. Although the rebels numbered some 10,000 irregulars throughout the country, they were dispersed in bands of 400 to 2,000 men and lightly armed. There was no central leadership of the anti-government forces and each group owed its loyalty only to its individual leader.

The Americans did not expect any reaction from the regular Lebanese Army though the danger existed that it might disintegrate into pro-government and rebel factions. Therefore, the only immediate effective threat was posed by the Syrian First Army, composed of 40,000 men— and equipped with over 200 T-34 Russian-built medium tanks. This was why it was so important that the airport and the approaches to the north of Beirut be secured.

Khalde (Red) Beach, the site chosen for the Marine assault was four miles from the city of Beirut and 700 yards from the Beirut International Airport. The small village of Khalde was located 1,500 yards south of the landing beach. On 15 July, the villagers were going quietly about their chores and a gang of workmen was constructing a beach road.

Further along the beach, some vacationers were enjoying the sun and others were swimming in the Mediterranean. It was a peaceful scene entirely divorced from revolutions, coup d'etas, and the troubles of the cold war.



In contrast to the mood of serenity on the beach, a sense of urgency was present in the offices of Chamoun, general Chehab, and Robert McClintock, the US ambassador in Beirut. McClintock knew the date and time, but not the place of the Marine landing.

He had been in communication with both Chamoun and Chehab. The State department had ordered the ambassador to inform Chamoun of the Marine landing no later than 1200 Beirut time on 15 July. When McClintock told the president of the proposed intervention, Chamoun asked the ambassador to relay this information to Chehab.

McClintock then visited Chehab at 1330, only an hour and a half before H-hour. Chehab was visibly upset by the news. The day before he had asked the leaders of the rebel forces to take no action in the wake of the Iraqi revolt.

The general felt confident that the rebels would not precipitate any new maneuvers against the government. Chehab had confided to the American military attache that some Lebanese army officers had proposed a coup to him that morning in order to prevent a landing but that he had refused.

The Lebanese general claimed he could not guarantee that all the army would remain loyal to him. He feared the US intervention would bring about the dissolution of the army and prevent any settlement of the revolt.

Chehab asked McClintock to request the Marines to remain on board their ships. The ships then could enter Beirut harbor and two or three tanks and some heavy equipment could be unloaded there. The ambassador agreed to transmit this message to the amphibious forces since he believed that if "General Chehab decided to throw in the sponge, the Lebanese army will fall apart."

McClintock then attempted to radio the American fleet, but the radio link between the Sixth Fleet and the embassy was broken and the ambassador was unable to transmit his message. He had received word, however, from friends who had apartments overlooking the sea that it was apparent that the TransPhibRon was approaching the beach area off the airport. McClintock then sent the aaval attache, commander Howard J. Baker, to intercept the advanced units of the assault force.

At 1430 (Beirut time), a half-hour before H-hour, the seven ships of Amphibious Squadron 6 were in position, approximately two miles off Red Beach. Shortly before 1500, the LVTPs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked, Personnel) were launched. Company F on board the LVTPs spearheaded the Marine landing. The amphibian tractors reached the shoreline at 1504 and rumbled onto the airfield. Companies G and H came ashore in landing craft and deployed on foot to their assigned objectives. Company E followed as the battalion reserve.

The scene on the beach was perhaps one of the most colorful in the long history of Marine Corps landings. Witnessing the assault were bikini-clad-sunbathers, Khalde villagers that had galloped on horseback to the site, and the beach workmen who had dropped their tools and had run to the shore.

As the fully armed Marines charged over the sand, these civilian observers waved and some even cheered. A few of the young boys even attempted to help the Marines in bringing ashore some of the heavier equipment. Soft drink vendors were out in full force. The Marines were prepared for any eventuality, but this reception was rather unexpected. As one Marine said, "It's better than Korea, but what the hell is it?"

Quickly taking control, all four rifle companies of 2/2 and the advance echelon of the command post landed within 20 minutes. As Company E cleared the civilians from the beach, Company G secured the airport terminal, and Companies F and H began to establish their positions about the airfield. The two destroyers and Navy planes from the aircraft carrier ESSEX stood by to support the Marine troops shore. No incidents took place and no shots were fired.

… …

As the supplies were being unloaded onto the beach, the Marines at the airport were consolidating their positions. By nightfall on the 15th, the defense perimeter had been adjusted to provide the most effective security. Liaison had been established with the Lebanese units at the airport and certain areas there were guarded jointly by Marines and Lebanese. A motorized platoon from Company E was placed in a standby position with orders to proceed, if necessary into Beirut to protect the American, French, or British Embassies.

At 2100, 15 July, a member of the UN observer team in Lebanon approached the command post. He asked the battalion commander which side the US forces were supporting. The Marine officer replied that his battalion was there to give assistance to the legal government of Lebanon. The UN official then implied that the US was backing the wrong side. Lieutenant colonel Hadd asked the observer very politely to leave the area.

Small patrols from the Marine companies were sent forward to probe for any irregular Lebanese armed groups that might be in the immediate area of the airport. These patrols returned at 0500, 16 July, and reported they had made no contact with any hostile forces.



At 0730, the first waves landed across Red Beach. Lieutenant colonel Robert M. Jenkins, the battalion commander, relayed to Hadd an order from general Wade for them to enter the city of Beirut. Wade left the at approximately 0800 to see McClintock in the city. Hadd told Wade that the battalion could be formed up in a column and ready to move. Wade then left with an official from the American Embassy to meet the ambassador.

When the general arrived at the embassy, McClintock was speaking on the telephone to Chehab. The Lebanese general was asking the ambassador to halt the proposed movement of the Marines into the city. Both the ambassador and Chehab were concerned that units of the Lebanese army might resist the Marine column.

The Ambassador told Chehab that he would speak to Chamoun about the situation and then asked General bade to hold up the advance. Wade replied that he had no authority to cancel the order but that he would postpone the troop movement.

Wade and McClintock, in the meantime, went to see Chamoun. The Marine told the president of the plan to enter the city and Chamoun agreed that the plan should be, executed immediately. McClintock and Wade returned to the embassy where the ambassador then called Chehab. Chehab requested that Wade hold up the Marine column for another 30 minutes. Wade agreed and ordered Hadd to prepare to get under way at 1030.

An aide informed Wade that a detachment of Lebanese tanks had set up a roadblock on the main road leading from the airport into Beirut. The general immediately informed the ambassador of the new turn of events. McClintock replied that he would speak to Chehab. Wade then procured an embassy car and proceeded towards the airport accompanied by two interpreters.

On the way, the general's car pulled up alongside one of the Lebanese tanks, a French-built medium armed with a 75mm gun, parked on the side of the road and Wade spoke to one of the Lebanese crewmen. In response to a question from the American general, the Lebanese soldier replied that he had orders to stop any movement into the city. He also volunteered the information that he had a cousin in New York.

General Wade then asked him if he would fire upon the American Marines. The soldier replied that he had no such orders but would have to check with his captain. Wade then drove on to the airport. He told Hadd that it was his opinion that the Lebanese would not fire at the Marines, but that the battalion should proceed with caution and be prepared for any eventuality.

At 1030, as the BLT was about to start out a Lebanese captain approached Hadd and Wade. The Lebanese officer stated that he had received a telephone call from General Chehab. The Lebanese general and the American ambassador were in conference and requested that the Marines wait another 30 minutes before starting towards Beirut. General Wade agreed to the request and postponed the movement until 1100.

At 1100, the Marines of BLT 2/2 boarded their tanks, LVTPs,and trucks, and moved out in column formation. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd halted his battalion in front of the Lebanese roadblock, one mile up from the airport. The guns of the Lebanese tanks were pointed directly at the lead vehicles in the Marine column.

While Admiral Holloway, General Wade, and Admiral Yeager were heading into Beirut, the ambassador's car, with ambassador McClintock and General Chehab inside, sped by going in the opposite direction, accompanied by a motorcycle escort. The American officers' car quickly swerved about and gave chase. Both automobiles arrived almost simultaneously at the roadblock where the Lebanese troops and American Marines faced one another.

Chehab suggested that the ambassador, the two admirals, and the Marine general accompany him to a small schoolhouse located a short distance from the road to discuss the confrontation between the Marine BLT and the Lebanese unit. Thus began the conference that was to settle the role the Marines were to play in Lebanon.

As this meeting took place on the main road, a second dangerous incident occurred in the sector of BLT 3/6. Companies I and K had secured their objectives, respectively to the east and south of the airport, without incident. In contrast, Company L was unable to reach its objective, located two miles due north of the airfield on a beach road, since the position was occupied by a Lebanese armored detachment.

The Marines had been instructed to consider all Lebanese army units friendly unless proven otherwise. With this in mind, captain Richard W. Coulter, commanding officer of Company L, halted his troops and advanced towards the Lebanese, accompanied only by his first sergeant.

The two Marines were immediately surrounded by excited Lebanese troops, who kept their weapons aimed at the two Americans. Although the captain and sergeant retained their arms, they were escorted under armed guard to a Lebanese Army barracks nearby.

There the captain discussed the impasse with an English-speaking Lebanese Army major. The Lebanese officer refused to allow the Marine Company to occupy the position. He did agree to release the sergeant, who was to bring back the battalion commander.

Lieutenant colonel Jenkins arrived at the barracks and also was unable to convince the Lebanese to retire. The Lebanese major finally offered to call Lebanese army headquarters in Beirut to obtain the advice of general Chehab.

The major was told that Chehab had just left with the ambassador to attempt to resolve the difficulties between the Marines and the Lebanese army on the main road to Beirut. Jenkins and the Lebanese major then made the decision that Company L and the Lebanese troops blocking its path would remain in their present positions while the major and lieutenant colonel Jenkins attempted to find Chehab. Captain Coulter returned to his company while the other two officers made their way to the Lebanese roadblock on the main road.

There the conference at the schoolhouse was still going on. Chehab asked that the Marines take a different route into the city. General Wade refused, however, and insisted that the Marines be allowed to complete its mission. He stated that time was an important factor and there had been enough delays. Admiral Holloway declared that the Marine column would move out without any further delay at 1200.

McClintock resolved the issue by suggesting that Chehab, Holloway, and himself ride together leading the Marines into Beirut but that they bypass the Muslim quarter, the Basta. This proposal proved agreeable to all parties and arrangements for the formation of the column were then ironed out. It was decided that BLT 2/2 should be broken down into small sections. Each section was to be led by a jeep carrying Lebanese army officers. At 1230, the column began to move with the Ambassador's car leading the Marines towards Beirut.

Once the BLT entered the city, Chehab got out of the lead car and Holloway ordered all intervals closed as the movement was bogging down. The admiral, assisted by admiral Yeager and general Wade, assumed personal tactical command... and even directed the units of the column to their billeting areas from the main gate of the dock area.

The Marines took control of the dock area, protected the bridges over the Beirut River on the Tripoli road, and furnished guards for the American embassy and the ambassador's residence. By 1900, the BLT had secured its objectives.

After the crisis between BLT 2/2 and the Lebanese troops was resolved, Jenkins was able to settle the differences between Company L and the Lebanese army detachment on the beach road. Liaison arrangements were made and Jenkins then returned to his command post at the Beirut airport.

Awaiting him there was a message from the Lebanese commander of the airport, who requested that the Marine officer meet with him at 1300 to discuss arrangements at the airfield. Jenkins arrived at approximately 1310 at the commander's office. There he was greeted by the commander's aide, who informed the American that the commander had tired of waiting and had departed for lunch.


Picture is of rebels on the march (Arab Image Foundation)

The aide then told Jenkins that he should return in 30 minutes and the airport commander would furnish orders for the disposition of the Marines. Upon hearing this, the BLT commander stated that he would return at 1600 with orders for the disposition of the Lebanese troops at the airfield. The Marine won his point, and an effective liaison with the Lebanese authorities at the airport was established.

This incident reflected the Marines' conception of their assignment. They were to be cooperative but firm. The Marines aided by the mediation of ambassador McClintock and general Chehab, were able to handle the very critical situation posed by the Lebanese roadblocks. The harassing maneuvers of a few Lebanese soldiers ceased, and the Marines were able to proceed with their mission.

… …

The Marines of BLT 2/2 in Beirut and BLT 3/6 at the airport spent a relatively peaceful night on 16-17 July. The only disturbances were small probing attacks by Lebanese rebels against forward Marine outposts. At 1800 and 2055, 16 July, groups of four to five Lebanese sniped at the Marine outpost south of the airfield but withdrew once the Marines returned the fire. The rebels came fain at 0600, 17 July and retreated once more in the face of Marine rifle fire. There were no casualties on either side as a result of these actions.

During the morning of 17 July, two Marines of BLT 2/2 were "captured" by rebel forces in the Basta area. The two men took a wrong turn in Beirut on their way to pick up some equipment at Red Beach and entered the Muslim section of the city. They were immediately surrounded by armed Lebanese insurgents and forced to surrender their arms.

The Lebanese escorted them to a rebel command post, where they were questioned. The interrogator asked the two Marines why they had come to Lebanon. The two Americans, not wishing to provoke their captors, replied they did not know. Thereupon the Lebanese rebel leader proceeded to lecture them about the "duplicity" of American foreign policy and the evil of American "imperialism". After an hour and half of this harangue, the two Marines were released. A Lebanese Army captain escorted them back to their battalion. Later in the day, the Lebanese Army returned the Marine jeep and the weapons of the two Americans.

These harassing maneuvers employed by the Lebanese rebels were to become commonplace. The Lebanese dissidents were attempting to provoke the Marines into rash retaliation, but were unsuccessful. The Marine forces were under strict orders to maintain fire discipline, and to shoot only in self-defense.

In order to further Lebanese Army and Marine cooperation, Wade visited Chehab on 17 July, at the latter's quarters in Junieh, 10 miles north of Beirut. In the course of their conversation, General Wade indicated that he did not wish to become involved in the Lebanese internal political situation.

Chehab replied that he understood General Wade's position and would discuss only military matters. It was not possible, however, to divorce entirely the military presence of the Marines in Lebanon from the political implications. Chehab stated that his army would fall apart if the Marines continued their movements into the city. The Lebanese general asked Wade to group the American force: in such a manner that the Marines would not give the appearance of being occupation troops.

The Marine general agreed to this request. Wade considered that the most important result of this conference with General Chehab was the agreement to attach Lebanese Army officers to the headquarters staff of the 2d Provisional Marine Force and to each of the Marine battalions.

Lebanese major Alexander Ghanem, attached to General Wade's headquarters, proved to be extremely useful to the Americans. According to colonel Hamilton Lawrence, chief of staff of the 2d provisional Marine Force:

“Was there a roadblock someplace manned by oddly dressed irregulars? Ghanem would consider the problem silently for a minute while seated by the phone, his fingertips pressed together. Course of action decided, he would pick up the phone and speak softly into it for only a few seconds. Fifteen minutes later our reporting unit would call and say the roadblock had melted away after a few words from some visiting Lebanese.”

The Lebanese officer who was attached to 2/2 requested lieutenant colonel Hadd to withdraw Companies E and F from their positions at the bridges over the Beirut river and at the eastern approaches to the city.

Units of the Lebanese Army also guarded these locations in the city, and Lebanese army officers believed the presence of the two Marine companies at these same sites would mean a loss of face to the Lebanese Army. The Lebanese feared, in addition, that the Marines might engage rebel elements that were firing sporadically at the Marine emplacements in these areas.

Hadd agreed to the withdrawal after consulting with American Embassy officials and moved both companies into the dock section of Beirut. He made it clear, however, that these new positions were not satisfactory as a permanent location.

… …

On 18 July, the Lebanese Army permitted the Marines to station Companies E and F of 2/2 at J'Daide, approximately a mile and a half to the east of Beirut. From there, both units would be able to move rapidly to the bridges and to the eastern approaches of the city if the occasion arose.

At 0900, 18 July, the third battalion of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, BLT 1/8 under Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley, landed at Yellow Beach, four miles north of Beirut. Companies A and B came ashore in landing craft and Company C, the battalion reserve, followed in LVTPs. The battalion fanned out and formed a crescent-shaped perimeter with Company B on the right flank, Company C on the left, and Company A in the center to protect the beachhead and the northern approaches to the city.

The only problems encountered were those posed by the usual congregation of Lebanese spectators and ice cream and watermelon vendors. One or two of the Navy landing craft had to swerve in order to avoid some children swimming in the water.

… …

The three Marine landings in Lebanon were only part of the American response to the crisis in the Middle East caused by the sudden eruption of the Iraqi Revolution. The United States could not be sure how other nations would react to the American intervention and had to be prepared for any eventuality.

On 14 and 15 July, plans were being made to provide for the assignment of the entire 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina to the Mediterranean area. In the Far East, BLT 3/3 on Okinawa was ordered to load on board an amphibious squadron and sail into the Persian Gulf and to be prepared to land in Iran or Saudi Arabia in the event the crisis spread. A regimental landing team, RLT-3 on Okinawa, was placed on a standby alert status.

The original plan, which called for the airlift of a British brigade into the Beirut airport, had to be revised in view of the agreement of 15 July between Eisenhower and prime minister Harold MacMillan that the British forces remain in reserve on Cyprus. Subsequently on 17 July, British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of King Hussein of that country.

… …

The period of 19-26 July, from the arrival of the first Army troops to the assumption of command by General Adams, was one of consolidation of liaison arrangements with the Lebanese Army. The relationship between Chehab and the American military improved. General Wade reminisced:

“He (General Chehab) objected to our coming into the city I think because he thought we were going to get involved in the Basta area. When it was quite clear that we were going to avoid that, it eased the situation considerably, the tension was lifted and he was more or less cooperative.”

During this period there was no combat activity with the exception of the continued harassing of Marine forward positions. One of the most potentially dangerous of these incidents occurred on 19 July at the airfield. Rebel groups had periodically been firing at American aircraft when they came in for landings. The rebel shots came from an area just south of the field.

A patrol from BLT 3/6 was dispatched to disperse the snipers. The Marine patrol became involved in a three-cornered fire fight, not only with the rebels but also with Lebanese police dressed in civilian clothes. There were no American casualties, although one gendarme was wounded. A later investigation proved that the Lebanese gendarmes had initiated the firing, mistaking the Marines for rebels. A Lebanese army unit moved into the area and stopped the rebel harassment of the American planes.



The US president, realizing the political implications of American intervention, sent deputy under secretary of state Robert D. Murphy to coordinate the activities of the US military command and the American Embassy in Lebanon. Murphy recalled that the president gave no specific orders except to promote the best interest of the US incident to the arrival of our forces in Lebanon."

When Murphy arrived in Lebanon on 17 July, he discovered that many of the members of the Lebanese Parliament planned to protest to the U. S. against she American intervention. He was able to persuade the legislators to drop this action, however, and concentrate on the problem of electing a new president.

He met with Admiral Holloway on a daily basis. The two agreed that much of the Lebanese internal conflict concerned personalities and had very little relation to international issues. It was apparent to both of them that Communism "was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection."

The main outside support of the Lebanese rebels came from Egypt and Syria and direct intervention from the United Arab Republic as a result of the American landings was unlikely. Murphy believed that the only solution to end the anarchy was the election of a new president. He and Holloway felt that Chamoun had overreached himself in the brambles of Lebanese politics and that the Lebanese Army was the only thing holding the government together.

… …

Chehab assured Murphy that the Army was willing to cooperate with the American forces but was unwilling to take any energetic action against the rebels, except to restrict rebel activity and contain it in certain districts.

Murphy decided that the only way to create a viable government was to bring the leaders of the dissident elements of the country together. Colonel William A. Eddy, a retired Marine officer, who was employed as a consultant to the American Arabian Oil Company, arranged for a meeting between Murphy and two of Saeb Salem's associates on 24 July.

The American attempted to convince the two Lebanese that the US had not intervened in order to keep Chamoun in office. He warned them that the indiscriminate firing at American troops should end. Murphy reassured the rebel spokesmen that the Americans wished to avoid any serious clash, "however, we must maintain the security of our troops and we also value American prestige." Saeb Salem apparently took heed of the American warnings since the rebel provocations against the American troops dropped off after this date.

Murphy was also able to convince the Druze chieftan [Kamal] Jumblatt and the Tripoli rebel leader Karami that the US intervention was not for the purpose of maintaining any one man in office. The way was then cleared for the Parliament to decide on a new president. The election was held on 31 July and General Chehab was elected president although his term of office was not scheduled to begin until 23 September.

… …

The Lebanese army commander, by not taking sides in the insurrection and by maintaining the integrity of the national army, had the support of all the various Lebanese political factions. With the hope of a stabilized government for Lebanon, the Americans were able to concentrate on the problems of pulling their troops out of Lebanon.

Secretary of state Dulles announced on 31 July that the US forces would be withdrawn as soon as the Lebanese government requested their removal. On 5 August, Admiral Holloway was directed to begin planning for the departure of the American military forces.

The order was based on the assumption that General Chehab would request the Americans to to leave when he took office. The Americans wished to keep the selection of their departure date in their own hands. Chehab indicated, however, that he wished the Americans to make only a token withdrawal until the internal situation in Lebanon was completely secure.

… …

The United States announced on 8 October that it was withdrawing all its forces from Lebanon. Through the period of 18 October, however, the date of departure of the RLT, nearly 2,000 Marines remained in the Beirut dock area and captain Werts and colonel McKennan "conducted considerable reconnaissance work throughout the Lebanese coastal area at Admiral Holloway's personal direction."

On 23 October, the Lebanese formed a government which included representatives from each of the major political parties and the last US army troops departed the country two days later.

From the vantage of today there seems to have been little connection between the Iraqi Revolution and the unrest in Lebanon, but it must be emphasized that this was not known at the time.There was a precarious political situation in Lebanon and also a real fear on the part of the loyalist supporters of Chamoun for the safety of his life and for the independence of the country.

Even if the events of 14 July were not the result of an international conspiracy, the balance of power in the Middle East could have been destroyed, creating a situation susceptible to Soviet exploitation.'

The full version is available on the US military website.

Don't interfere!

George Bush has warned Syria not to interfere in Lebanon's elections.

The money quote is:

"I am deeply concerned about foreign interference in the election. The message has been sent to nations such as Syria that they should not interfere."

The report in China's news agency then dropped a little fact in for us to chew on: 'A top U.S. military commander will go to Lebanon to asses the needs of Lebanese security forces, Bush said.'

Hmmm, and that's not interfering, apparently.

Meanwhile the counterterrorismblog reports that, "A well-informed sources close to the teams working on the Lebanese file within the Administration and in Congress told us today that the Lebanese legislators are the only ones who have been mandated by their voters to elect a new President of the Republic in Lebanon..."

But, "The sources added that they have been informed about a so called proposal by Iran’s leadership to politicians in Lebanon on virtue of which Tehran and Damascus would stop the violence campaign, allow an acceptable President (by them) to be elected and conclude a truce; in return the new cabinet formed after the election would stop calling for the implementation of UNSCR 1559 and the disarming of the militias, particularly Hezbollah.

"The sources said if this is what these politicians want, they need to understand that they will not be backed by the international community or by the United States. They will face Syria and Iran alone and will have to explain it to their constituents.

"The sources said these messages will be soon transmitted to whoever has to hear them."

I wonder if Hariri "got the message". Well yes, apparrently, as he rushed to announce that "his country was facing a potential crack-up unless the United States threw its weight behind the pro-democracy movement" (otherwise known as the sectarian rulers and war criminals).

Presidential elections

Sami Moubayed gives a good general briefing on the Lebanese presidential elections in Asia Times.

"Lebanese politics is sharply polarized into two camps, which refuse to back down...

"One faction is headed by Saad al-Hariri, the parliamentary-majority leader who rose to fame after the assassination of his father, former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, in 2005.

"It includes heavyweights from the Sunni community, like Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora, the Christian community, including former warlord Samir Gagegea and ex-president Amin Gemayel, and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.

"Most of this team (with the exception of Gagegea and Gemayel) were once loudly pro-Syrian. They worked with and legitimized the Syrian military presence in Lebanon throughout the 1990s.

"As long as the Syrians continued to support and reward them with government office, they remained pro-Syrian. All of them, including Jumblatt and Siniora, were ministers under Rafik Hariri, during the Syrian heyday in Lebanon."

Photo: Election posters of Free Partiotic Movement leader (and presidential hopeful) Micheal Aoun are defaced by supporters of the right wing Lebanese Forces. Posters of Bashir Gemayel, who was killed by a missive bomb in 1982, are eveywhere in Christian east Beirut. However the pro-resistance FPM still enjoys popular support from a majority of Lebanese (Christian and Muslim).

Poverty 1959-60

A UN study of Lebanon in the early 1960s found:

"In addition to the disparities in levels of development between Beirut and the peripheral areas; or between the city and the countryside in general, or even as a function of geographic proximity to Beirut, the IRFED study unveiled huge disparities in income distribution for the interval 1959-1960.

"The richest 4 percent among the Lebanese appropriated 32 percent of the national income, whereas the poor constituted 50 percent of the population, including 9 percent which the study considered as 'wretched'."

Qana 2006

An aerial photo released by the Israeli army to justify their attack on Qana shows a rocket launch site in a field outside the village (bottom left).

The Israelis claim that the rockets were being fired from near the house where civilians were sheltering.

Yet the roads that can been seen in the Google map (above), marked (I), are 800 metres to the south of the house targetted by the missile, marked as (J).

Qana was the scene of a previous massacre during Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. Over 100 civilians were killed as they sought shelter in the UN base, marked as (G).

Other launch sites identified in the aerial evidence are in the fields to the south of the village.

Indiscriminate

The New York based Human Rights Watch has published a new report that accuses Israel of the "indiscriminate airstrikes" agaisnt Lebanese civilians. The rights group found no evidence of Hezbollah’s shielding— as Israel claims— behind civilians.

To quote HRW report:
"In the vast majority of cases documented in this report, Israeli air strikes hit near or on civilian objects, killing numerous civilians in their homes or vehicles. While there were instances in which civilian deaths were “collateral damage” from legitimate attacks on military targets, during the vast majority of the deadly air strikes we investigated, we found no evidence of Hezbollah military presence, weaponry or any other military objective that would have justified the strike.

"Human Rights Watch visits to the graveyards in the villages found that the victims of these strikes were buried as civilians, and not honored as “fighters” or “martyrs” by Hezbollah or other militant groups, despite the pride that Hezbollah takes in these labels. Women and children account for a large majority of the victims of Israeli air strikes that we documented.

"Out of the 499 Lebanese civilian casualties of whom Human Rights Watch was able to confirm the age and gender, 302 were women or children.

"Throughout the conflict, Israeli warplanes targeted civilian vehicles on roads and homes, apparently assuming them to be Hezbollah military movements.

"Among the deadly attacks on civilians trying to flee the conflict are the killing of 23 civilians, including 14 children and seven women, fleeing from Marwahin on July 15; the killing of six and wounding of eight civilians fleeing from `Aitaroun on July 19; the killing of three and wounding of 14 civilians fleeing from al-Tiri on July 23; the killing of 2 and wounding of four civilians fleeing from Mansouri on July 23; the wounding of nine civilians fleeing from Mansouri on July 23; the wounding of six ambulance drivers and three passengers in Qana on July 23; the killing of one civilian on a motorcycle on his way to buy food and medicines on July 24; the killing of seven civilians fleeing from Marja`youn on August 11; and the killing of seven and wounding of six civilians in the Beka` Valley on August 14. In all these cases, there is no evidence of a Hezbollah military presence that would justify the attacks."

The photo caption reads:
QANA, LEBANON - JULY 30: (EDITORS NOTE: GRAPHIC CONTENT) A rescue team member extracts the dead body of one of the victims of the Israeli air strike from the rubble of the building that was hit July 30, 2006 in Qana, Southern Lebanon. Approximately 56 civilians were killed, at least 34 of them children, and dozens trapped under debris, after an Israeli air strike on the village of Qana in southern Lebanon, resulted in the deadliest attack since fighting began. (Photo by Marco Di Lauro/Getty Images)

Tripoli 1969

A fascinating documentary in French made in 1969 about the fighting between the Arab nationalists, Palestinians and the army. Includes interviews with rebels and politicians such as Rachid Karameh, Pierre Gemayel and others.

The fighting lead to the Cairo Accords that gave the Palestinians control over their camps and the right to use Lebanon to launch raids on Israel.

Go to the link Veillée d'armes au Liban

Sit-in at the port

Municipality workers in the port of Beirut staged a sit-in at the union offices to protest agaisnt the non payment of wages.
The protest lasted 3 hours. The leader of the union explained that the "workers have not receive their salaries since last July".

Lebanon 1978

Lebanon July/August 2006

On the anniversary of the end of the Israeli war on Lebanon it is worth revisiting some of the best blogs written at the time.

The Siege of Lebanon is a remarkable collection of eyewitness reports of everyday life during wartime, while the Samidoun relief network gives a detailed insight into the suffering and destruction.

The most cutting comments remains, however, Anecdotes from a Banana Republic. ABR's description of how rich Lebanese drank and danced while the country was in flames is one of the best descriptions of all that is wrong in our country.

Who's army?

One year ago the Lebanese army was serving tea to Israeli troops who invaded the south.


Today they gun down unarmed Palestinian demonstrators in the Bedawi refugee camp, Tripoli.

Radio Tadamon

“Notwithstanding President Bush’s new 'forward strategy of freedom,' the United States has marshaled nothing more than a few hollow demurrals against the antidemocratic abuses by its allies, and it maintains close partnerships with all of America’s old authoritarian friends in the region.”

Tadamon, the Canadian solidarity network, are podcasting an interview with the editor of Harpers Magazine, Ken Silverstein, on Islamic Democracy and the War on Terror

Aita al-Shaab 2006

One year ago I travelled with photographer Guy Smallman to the southern Lebanese village of Aita al-Shaab. We interviewed locals and fighters about the ferocious battles between the resistance and Israeli troops that had taken place during the July war.

My report was published in Socialist Worker.

There is one memory that remains with me. When the Israeli troops abandoned their positions on the edge of the town they left their supply of bottled mineral water—most of it was still cold.

As the town was cut off for over a month, and water was desperately short, it was a godsend for the survivors. Did the soldiers leave the water as a humanitarian gesture? One of the locals seemed to think so. If any of the Israeli soldiers who were involved in the battle reads this I would be interested to know if there is any truth to the story.

The picture above is of a civilian car hit by shrapnel on the edge of the town. It is one of a series taken by Guy of the war.

I have learnt that Guy spent the anniversary of the war under interrogation by the US Department of Homeland Security when he was returning from covering the elections in Mexico. I'm sure he was not too hard on them.

Tripoli 2007

“‘Mother, I’m injured’, he told me and I could hear the bullets flying,” she says in the family’s three-room flat in Bab al-Tebbaneh, a poor quarter in the northern Lebanese town of Tripoli. “Then there were no more words, only bullets.”


Truancy and child labour are endemic in poor parts of Tripoli. Picture: Lucy Fielder/IRIN


Mohammed Al-Jassem holds a picture of his dead son, killed by the Lebanese army as an alleged Fatah al-Islam militant. Picture: Lucy Fielder/IRIN


Poverty despite the promise. Picture: Lucy Fielder/IRIN

Welcome the new US ambassador to Lebanon

According to the International Herald Tribune, it appears that the US has taken the unusual step of appointing Antoine Chedid, a friend of the March 14 bloc, as the Lebanese ambassador to Washington.

This might seem a change in diplomatic etiquette, as usually it is the right of a sovereign country to decide who should be appointed to represent it.

Chedid pleases Condoleeza Rice, it appears. Whereas the actual ambassador, Farid Abboud, did not. Apparently Abboud was "too close to Syria" (not sure if this is politically or physically).

But why rest on old fashioned protocol? If the US can decide who represents Lebanon in Washington, then surely we can decide who represents the US in Beirut.

My nomination for the post is Mumia Abu Jumal. Welcome Mr Ambassador.

A battle between rich and poor

"I have looked at the world with an objective eye and found it to be a major battlefield between the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak."

Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak (1901-1982) One of the founders of the communist movement in Lebanon. From the article "Socialism in Lebanon" published in al-Sahafi al-Ta˓eh newspaper, 5 May 1923

Click on header to read the first chapter of The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon, by Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael


A crowd watches the roadblocks burn, Beirut, 23 January 2007. Thousands of Lebanese demonstrators blocked main roads in the capital and around the country, burning rubble and tyres, protesting against the government. The strike was abandoned in the afternoon. (Picture: Irin)

Lebanon in Scotland

Cluster bombs—the deadly legacy of Israel's war on Lebanon (picture: Irin)

It is now one year since the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon. Much of the infrastructure of the south – bridges, roads, power stations, businesses and homes – was wiped out.

Thousands of innocent people were killed.

All with the full support of the British and US governments. Tony Blair and George Bush ignored the world (once again) and blocked the international call for a ceasefire at the UN, EU and G8.

Israeli troops were finally driven out of the country by the popular resistance of the Lebanese people, led by Hizbollah, but not before Israel dropped over a million cluster bombs in the last few days before a ceasefire was reached.

Glasgow Stop the War Coalition, Glasgow Lebanese community and Landmine Action are organising an event to mark the war with speakers and discussion.
 
Sunday 12 August
4.30-7.30pm
 
Charles Wilson building
(corner of Gibson Street & University Avenue)



Among the guests are Azzam Tamimi from the Institute of Islamic Political Thought; Caoimhe Butterly, the Irish antiwar activist who heckled Tony Blair's press conference in Lebanon last summer; Nicola Fisher, Chair of Glasgow Stop the War Coalition and human rights lawyer Aamer Anwar

Plus speakers from Landmine Action, Scottish Labour Party, Scottish Nationalist Party and others.

If you would like to help spread the word about this event
call 0044 7952 452 906.

Still missing

Um Tayssir, 70, was kidnapped along with her husband and her 3 little boys by the Lebanese Forces at the notorious Barbara checkpoint north of Beirut in 1982.

Her family were fleeing the capital following the Sabra and Chatila massacres. She was released but her husband and sons were kidnapped. She is still searching for them.

Lebanon's People's trbunal

Farah Koubaissy is one of the organisers of the tribunal. She explains why it was launched.

Can you outline for me the aims of the People’s tribunal?
The people’s tribunal has 3 main goals:
- To announce the Truth and to point the responsibilities of the war crimes during the Lebanese civil war.
- To push those who are responsible, to confess their responsibility, to give the right reparations for the victims and to declare the destiny of the missing and the kidnapped people.
- To realize the true reconciliation so that war doesn’t return anymore.

Who has been invited?
On April 14 we launched the people’s tribunal under the slogan “Yes to the annulment of the amnesty law – Justice for the Victims".

The event was called "To be remembered in order not to be repeated – It will not be repeated". Although the invitation was public, the organizations that joined the campaign were: The Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union, Nahnou Student Group, Leftist Assembly for Change, The Civil Society Current, Khiam Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture, the Union of Democratic Youth, and the Socialist Forum. The tribunal was supported by the Committee for the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared.

Currently, we are trying to network with various organizations and individuals working on human rights and transitional justice. These include law experts to prepare the legal files, journalists, members of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee, and artists.

And of course since the tribunal is public, it is necessary and elemental to expand the popular base.

Where is it taking place?
Since we are insisting on the public criteria of the tribunal, the launching took place on the cornice of Ain Al Mraysee in Beirut. Most events will be planned for open and public spaces. This is one of the main reasons why graffiti artists and musicians have joined the campaign.

Why have you decided to launch it now?
The people tribunal came as a natural response to what we considered as ignorance on the part of the judiciary in dealing with lawsuits against war criminals.

The first complaint was presented against the kidnappers of Mohieddine Hachicho, a school teacher "diseappeared" by right wing militias in 1982. Since 1991, the courts have been looking into the case and postponing it even though there are witnesses that saw Hachicho being kidnapped and who followed the kidnappers to the military base where they kept him.

The latest complaint was presented by former prisoners in Israeli jails against Samir Gaegae, the leader of a right wing militia, the Lebanese Forces. Lebanese courts refused to look into the complaint under the pretext of the amnesty given to Gaegae in 2005, following the US backed "Cedar Revolution".

The amnesty law was part of the Taef Agreement that put an end to civil hostilities in 1990. It has been criticized by most human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who consider that war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as the massacres and killings based on identity cards perpetrated by the Lebanese warlords who are currently in government, cannot be covered by amnesty.

The people’s tribunal is the result of many years of struggles against the Lebanese ruling class that seeks to undermine our collective memory and to dissimulate the truth about the crimes committed during the civil war.

Who is supporting the tribunal?
There is no external financial support and most of the work was done by organizations who have been following the issue for years, especially the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared.

Politically speaking, there are sympathizers such as human right activists, a small number of journalists, and a few lawyers. But of course, there is no official support.

How will the tribunal work?
The people’s tribunal is a new experience for Lebanese civil society. We are learning from similar experiences applied in different regions over the world such as Argentina and South Africa.

We started collecting experiences and testimonies of witnesses and victims. These testimonies will be reviewed by legal specialists to determine the juridical responsibilities of the cases.

The complaint will be based on international conventions and treaties that Lebanon is part of, especially since they are considered to be an integral part of the constitution.

Public hearings will be held on 13 April 2008 in which testimonies will be presented. Prior to that, we will be organizing in schools, universities, public conferences. Organizational meetings are also open to all who are interested.

What do you hope to achieve?
Our goal is to push the authorities to cancel the general and the private amnesty laws in order to make the accountability process possible, to determine responsibilities, to declare publicly the destiny of the kidnapped, and to give reparations to the victims or their families.

There is an old tradition in Lebanon in which any accountability is denied. There is no culture of accountability, only the culture of forgetting. This is a tradition that we want to smash.

We are saying that from now on, our security and our lives are not a toy to play with. We are here to know what really happened and it is our right to know.

If this doesn’t occur, nothing will prevent any war to come. Today, for example, the Lebanese army declared war against a terrorist group called Fateh El Islam. We do not know who is Fateh El Islam? How did they get here? Who was financing them? All what we know is that suddenly war was declared and suddenly it stopped...

Finally, accountability is the only way to free the Lebanese society from the weight of the past. Without it, our destiny will always be in the hands of a bunch of criminals.

What has been the response from the parties or the government?
For several years the response of the government to the demands of the families' committee was to say that "all the disappeared were killed so there’s no need to search for them." The families were accused of exhuming the memory of the war that “the Lebanese want to forget” and of awakening the sensibilities of the war.

This year, the response of the authorities was to ignore the demands. The parties of the government (14 March) organized a long day, on the occasion of 13 April (the anniversary of the war) using a similar slogan. It was televised on government controlled channels and was financed and run by the same agencies that ran the Cedar Revolution. But did not question anyone, preferring empty slogans and denying responsibility by claiming that "we are all responsible". This is partly true, since, with a few exceptions, all of the ruling March 14 coalition were involved in the war of 1975-1990 or in financing it.

The traditional left was silent maybe because they share the same fears as the war criminals, since they were allied with some of them during the crimes in question.